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The determinants of public spending: 
an overview in a methodological 
perspective 
 
SURVEY: This article shows that applied econometric is not a way of selecting, from among 
a plethora of possible explanations of public spending evolution. It lists 19 explanations 
and 73 explanatory variables and provides evidence of the great confusion in this field and 
the relative emptiness of quantitative economics. Then it sustains the Mayer’s idea that 
“given all the weakness of econometric techniques, other ways of testing, such as appeals to 
qualitative economic history, should not be treated as archaic”. 
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1. Introduction 
The general growth of government spending in the last hundred and fifty years and in 
industrial societies is a fact established (Borcherding 1977, Flora et al. 1983, Mitchell 
1998). The explanation of the growth of government size has also received numerous 
theoretical explanations (Larkey, Stolp, and Winner 1981, Borcherding 1985, Mueller 
1987, Hosley and Borcherding 1997; Mueller 2003; Bergh and Henrekson 2011).  
This article lists 19 explanations and 73 explanatory variables. It shows also that the 
“covering law model” (Hempel 1942) fails when it is applied to explain the evolution of 
public spending. The “covering law” model is based on mathematical physics. Taking 
physical sciences as a model, economics deals with efficient causes i.e. A (say, a billiard 
ball) strikes B (another ball) and causes it to move (Hoover 2008, p.719). In Wagner’s 
Law economic development, for instance, is the shock which causes public spending. 
This physical approach has a lot of problems. These are the traditional problems of 
regressions parameter heterogeneity, outliers, omitted variables bias, model 
uncertainty, measurement error, endogeneity (Rodrik 2012, p.319), and ecological 
inference. There is, also, the fact that the results of regressions are often un-conclusive 
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and it is always difficult to know if A strikes B or B strikes A. It is important also to recall 
that journals do not publish papers that find statistically insignificant results. That limits 
our knowledge of correlations between the variables and our ability to evaluate their 
qualities.  
Therefore beyond the necessary work to know the literature on this topic, this paper 
inserts in the controversy around the ability of quantitative analysis to learn us 
something. There are no law, no generality in this literature. Econometric’ literature 
seems only a way to tell the history of public finance with statistic. Quantitative would 
not useless, but would promise more than it could be deliver. 
The article is composed of twenty sections organized into a theoretical and an empirical 
part. The last section concludes with a table summarizing all the theories proposed, the 
explanatory variables used and the presence or absence of a consensus on the proposed 
explanation. This will provide evidence of the great confusion in this field and the 
relative emptiness of quantitative economics. 
2. Income and Wagner’s Law 
The first explanation is by the incomes. It is the result of inductive approach. The 
economists give ad hoc explanation. They observe a correlation between the two events 
and try to explain why. This section is the longer because income has been the variable 
more tested by the literature. The tests of Wagner's hypothesis accumulated evidence 
are unsupportive the law.  
2.1 Theoretical approach 
When in an economy, the incomes increase the public spending rise also. This 
explanation is either an empirical generalization (Laskey et al. 1981) or it is micro-
founded on a theory of demand or supply. Income per capita and/or Wealth per capita 
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operate similarly (Pryor 1968, p.53). They affect not only demand but reflect taxable 
capacity and the cost of government services as well (Pryor 1968, p.53). That explains 
why there are two interpretations of the correlation income- public spending. 1) 
Wagner’s law argues that in a society where the income progresses, government 
involvement in fiscal-budgetary matters rises even faster (Borcherding 1985, p.365). 2)  
In the leviathan fiscal theory the government is viewed as a malevolent revenue 
maximizer rather than a benevolent public goods provider. The size of State is a function 
of the capacity of citizens to limit the revenues of government to a given amount.  
2.1.1 Wagner’s Law 
In Wagner’s law perspective income per capita (Biehl 1998) is a variable affecting 
primarily demand for public consumption expenditures. It is an empirical generalization 
(Larket et al. 1981, p.176, Peacock and Scott 2000) or a theoretical perspective, using 
inductive methodology.  Wagner sustained that growing population and economics 
demand an increasingly larger state sector to service them with collective goods. He saw 
three main reasons for the increased of public spending: industrialization i.e. 
urbanization, the rise of population and economic development. Urbanization and 
increased population density would give more social frictions and more expenditure on 
law and order. The growth in real income would facilitate the relative expansion of 
expenditures on certain income elastic demands (Henrekson and Lybeck 1988, p.217). 
Then the empirical question is “whether the income elasticity of demand for public 
consumer goods is in excess of unity” (Musgrave 1969, p.78).  
 
Indeed, Wagner’s Law assumes an elasticity of demand for public goods superior to one; 
   . With an elasticity equal to one if the income doubles the demand for public goods 
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doubles. With an elasticity superior to one the demand for public good increases more 
than proportionally than the incomes.  
2.1.2 The government as Leviathan 
In Fiscal Leviathan hypothesis government is perceived as revenue-maximizing entities 
which seek to exploit the citizen through excessive rates of taxation. The degree of 
exploitation depends 1) on the number of competing governments and citizen mobility 
and 2) on the level of incomes. The rise of income per capita is an opportunity for Fiscal 
Leviathan to capture a rent. Economic development increases the table capacity of 
Government and in fine its size.  
2.1.3 Causality and Keynes’s Effect 
It is possible also that more prosperity does not lead to higher size of State but that more 
size of State does lead to more prosperity. The causality is the other problem. Keynesian 
school considers public expenditure as a determinant of aggregate income, invoking a 
reverse causality, running from public expenditure to GDP. It is not a proposition about 
short-run co-variation. In short or long run public spending supports economic growth 
(Keynes’s effect) and in long run economic growth explains the rise of government size 
(Wagner’ law). Meltzer and Richard (1981) justify also a reverse relationship. When 
economy grows, incomes of skilled workers might increase much more than the income 
of unskilled workers, leading to increased inequality. Then, there are more voters for 
redistribution and a higher level of government spending (Oxley 1994, p.288). 
2.2 Empirical Tests 
Empirically, different interpretations of the Wagner’s Law have been tested for many 
different countries (Tarschys 1975, Afxentiou and Serletis 1992, Peacock and Scott 
2000, p.7):   
-1-  G=f(Y) i.e.Peacock-Wiseman’s interpretation (1961), 
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-2- GC=f(Y) i.e. Pryor’s interpretation (1968), 
 
-3-  G=f(Y/N) i.e. Goffman’s interpretation (1968), 
 
-4- G/Y=f(Y/N) i.e. Musgrave’s interpretation (1969), 
 
-5- G/N=f(Y/N) i.e. Gupta (1967) or Michas’s (1975) interpretation 
 
and -6- G/Y=f(Y) i.e. Mann’s interpretation (1980) “modified Peacock-Wiseman version 
 
where G = total government expenditure1, GC = (total) government consumption 
expenditure2, Y = gross domestic product and N =  population.  
2.2.1 The great confusion around Wagner’s Law 
There is a great confusion in the results (Table 1).  
2.2.1.1 Diversity of Methods 
Bohl (1996) attributed the conflicting findings to the different econometric 
methodologies used. Firstly there is the traditional conflict between cross section 
analysis and time series studies. Bird (1971) argued that given cultural and institutional 
differences across countries, cross-sectional multi-country studies do not necessarily 
prove or disprove Wagner’s Law. Secondly, before 1985 mostly studies used Ordinary 
least squares method for stochastic modeling (Wagner and Weber 1977).  
 
Beginning with Henrekson (1993) all the studies employed unit root and co-integration 
methodologies, although not in a panel data because many studies of Wagner’s law used 
inappropriate estimation techniques when confronted with non-stationary time series 
data. Co-integration approach is a mean to examine if there is any long run relationship 
between spending and national income (Henrekson 1993, Ansari 1997). Early studies 
                                                          
1 Total general government expenditure is defined in ESA-95 §8.99 by reference to a list of categories: 
intermediate consumption, gross capital formation, compensation of employees, other taxes on 
production, subsidies, payable property income, current taxes on income, wealth, etc., social benefits, 
some social transfers, other current transfers, some adjustments, capital transfers and transactions on 
non-produced assets. 
2 General government final consumption expenditure (formerly general government consumption) 
includes all government current expenditures for purchases of goods and services (including 
compensation of employees). It also includes most expenditures on national defense and security, but 
excludes government military expenditures that are part of government capital formation. 
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using co-integration used the Engle and Granger methodology whereas more recent 
works apply the Johansen (1988) technique (Magazino 2012). The majority of the recent 
studies used econometric techniques such as co-integration analysis and Granger 
causality test (Biswal et al. 1999, Sideris 2007). However, despite the more rigorous 
methods Table 1 does not show a break or convergence after 1993 i.e. the treatment of 
spurious regressions. So it is may be not a good explanation of the diversity of results. 
Table 1. No consensus around Wagner’s law  
(Bibliography in Appendix Table A.1, 105 articles) 
Developed countries 
(105 developed countries 
have been studied in the 105 
papers published between 
1967- 2012) 
Developing Countries 
(66 developing countries have 
been studied in the 105 papers 
published between 1967- 2012) 
Mix Sample 
(15 countries have been studies in 
the 105 papers published  
between 1967-2012) 
50.47% valid Wagner’s Law  46.96% valid Wagner’s Law  40% valid Wagner’s Law  
32 developed countries 
studied between 1967-1992 
46.87% 
73 developed countries 
studied between 1993-2012  
52.05% valid Wagner’s Law 
12  developing countries studied  
between 1967-1992  
50% valid Wagner’s Law 
54 developing countries between 
1993 - 2012  
46.29% valid Wagner’s Law  
6 mix sample between 1967-1992  
33.33% valid Wagner’s Law 
9 mix sample between 1993-2012  
44.44% valid Wagner’s Law 
2.2.1.2 The causality 
There is also a great confusion in the analysis of the causality. At beginning Singh and 
Sahni (1984, Karavitis 1987) deployed the Granger method to determine the directions 
and patterns of causality and suggested that confirmed neither Wagnerian nor the 
Keynesian view. However Table 2 does not show a clear result about causality. Modern 
tries to limit these un-conclusive results to using instrumental variables3 to create a 
variation in government size that ideally can be used to properly identify the causal 
effect (Bergh and Henrekson 2011, p.11). Afonso and Furceri (2010) or Fölster and 
                                                          
3
 Informally, in attempting to estimate the causal effect of some variable x on another y, an instrument is a 
third variable z which affects y only through its effect on x. For example, suppose a researcher wishes to 
estimate the causal effect of political ideology on economic growth. Correlation between political ideology 
(statistically) and economic growth does not imply that ideology causes a weak economic growth because 
other variables may affect both economic growth and political ideology, or because political ideology may 
affect economic growth in addition to economic growth causing ideological variations. The researcher 
may proceed to attempt to estimate the causal effect of political ideology from observational data by using 
the effect of North American political ideology on french political ideology as in intrument. If North 
American political ideology affect economic growth only because they affect french political ideology, 
correlation between political ideology and economic growth is evidence that political ideology causes 
changes in economic growth.  
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Henrekson (2001) used as instrument the share of government and revenue by its 
lagged value. Then instrumental variables gives a causal interpretation rather favorable 
at the Keynes’ Effect but with a negative sign. 
 
However the use of an instrumental variable simply produces additional evidence of a 
statistical relationship (in this case between 'instrumental variable' and 'G'), without 
providing evidence of what type of relationship it is, and without providing evidence for 
the type of relationship between 'GDP' and 'G'. Moreover the instruments are not 
plausibly all predetermined (Sims 2010, p.61). In a world where people learn, it is also 
always very hard to establish the sense of the causality. If the facts of the social sciences 
are what people think and believe then social scientists have to explain how people 
learn (Storr 2010, p.35). If the learning process is central then quantitative approach is 
not sufficient. It is obvious, for instance, in a learning process perspective, than the rise 
of public spending can have a negative effect on economic growth, and people knowing 
that can try to limit this growing. The evolution of income per capita is both the cause 
and the consequence of government size. The new methods can improve the quality of 
causality tests using discontinuity design and more generally quasi experiment, but if 
the causal relationship is circular or dialectic it is a bad question.  
2.2.1.3 The diversity of interpretations 
There are multiple interpretations of the relationship GDP or income per capita and 
public spending. “Because economics is not an experimental science, economists face 
difficult problems of inference. The same data generally are subject to multiple 
interpretations” (Sims 2010, p.60). In Fiscal Leviathan hypothesis government is 
perceived as revenue-maximizing entities which seek to exploit the citizen through 
excessive rates of taxation. The degree of exploitation depends on the number of 
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competing governments and citizen mobility and on the level of incomes. The 
falsification of Wagner’s Law challenges this reasoning and impact also the Laffer curve. 
Indeed the Laffer curve is a good example of an economic constraint on the 
government’s ability to collect taxes (Holcombe and Mills 1995, p.449).  
2.2.1.4 Econometric theory promises more than it can deliver 
The main reason to use econometric method was to define a structural model through 
an equation;         . In Wagner’s Law G denotes total government spending 
and X denotes GDP or total personal income (Higgs 2007, p.34). If β=0.3 then every 
additional dollar of personal income gave rise to an additional thirty cents of 
government spending (Higgs 2007, p.34). In average there is a negative effect between 
size of government and economic growth, but in some countries high taxes seem able to 
enjoy above average growth.  
There are outliers. Bergh and Henrekson (2011) discuss two explanations of this 
phenomenon. One hypothesis is that countries with higher social trust levels are able to 
develop larger government sectors without harming the economy. Another explanation 
is that countries with large governments compensate for high taxes and spending by 
implementing market-friendly policies in other areas. These outliers add at the 
confusion. Durevall and Henrekson (2011) and our survey of literature show, 
nonetheless, that this structural relationship is localized in a very short time, 30 or 40 
years, and in space. Each country has its own coefficient. Durevall and Henrekson (2011) 
show also that there are structural breaks and no regularity. Each period of public 
finance history has its own characteristics. It is futile, in these conditions, to look for the 
determinants of size of government. There are determinants for each country and each 
period. Wagner’s Law is true but not all the time.  
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Table 2. Wagner’s Law versus Keynes’ Effect: the results stay ambiguous  
(Bibliography in Appendix Table A.2, 40 papers) 
Neither nor Keynesian 
view 
Wagnerian View Short run/long 
Run 
Bi-directionnal 
Granger Test. 
Singh and al. 1984): 
Indian (1950-1981) 
Ram (1986):  63 
countries. Demirbas 
(1999): Turkey (1950-
1990); Bagdigen and 
al. (2003): Turkey 
(1965-2000); Dogan 
and al. (2006): 
Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore 
and Thailand. 
Granger Test 
 
Ghali (1999);  
Biswal and al 
(1999); Tan 
(2003); 
Chimobi 
(2009) 
 
Magazzino (2012): 
confirmsfor developing 
countries. 
Granger Test. 
Ram (1988 4 ): USA 
(1929-1983) 
Park (1996): South-
Korea. 
Cletsos and al. (19975): 
Greece  
Abizabeh and al. 
(1998): South Korean 
  
Granger Test and 
Homes-Hutton test 
Ansari and al. 
(1997): Ghana, 
Kenya and South 
Africa (1961-1992) 
Cointegration 
Anwar et al. 
(1996 6 ): 88 
Countries 
 Engle-Granger error 
correction approach 
Islam (2001): USA 
(1929-1996) 
 Abu-Bader and 
al. (2003); 
Dritsakis and al. 
((2004);  
Loizides and al. 
(2005); 
Samudran and 
al. (2009); 
Kucukkale and 
al. (2012) 
Afxentiou et al. 
(1992) 
Sinha (1998) 
Muhlis and al  
(2003)  
Lyare (2004) 
Halicioglu (2006) 
Sinha (2007) 
Afzal and al. (2010) 
Courakis et al. 
(19937): Portugal and 
Greece. 
 
Multivariate 
cointegration 
Via money 
stock and 
budgetary 
deficits Ahsan 
and al. (1992) 
via money 
supply. 
Ying-Foon 
and al. (2002)  
Chandran and 
al. (2011) 
Co-integration and 
Granger Test 
Oxley (1994): UK 
(1870-1913); Thornton 
(1999): Europe (XIX 
century); Yuk (2005):  
UK (1830-1993); 
Aregbeyen (2006); 
Richter et al. (2012): 
Greece (1833-2010) 
Multivariate and co-
integration test 
Chow and al. (2002) 
Al-Faris (2002): Gulf 
countries. 
Johansen 
multivariate 
cointegration 
Tang (2001): 
Malaysia (1960-
1998), short run but 
not in long run. 
ARDL, VECM, 
Granger test 
Akpan (2011): 
Nigeria (1970-
2008), Wagner Law  
in long run and 
Keynes’ effect in 
short run. 
Asymetrical 
relationship 
Government 
expenditure 
react 
asymmetrically 
conditional on 
the state of 
economic 
growth (Wahab 
2004, Kolluri 
and al. 2007) 
 
So it is not a law. There is neither necessity nor regularity. It is an answer to Lewis-Beck 
and Rice (1985, p.26) who saw no reason why their model of government growth, 
although developed out of the United States’ experience, would not be applicable in its 
                                                          
4 In general it seems that causality runs mainly from revenue to expenditure in the federal data, but 
predominantly from expenditure to revenue in data for the state and local government sector. 
5Chletsos and Kollias’s (1997) study examines the validity of Wagner’s law in the case of Greece by 
considering disaggregated public expenditure and found support for the law only in the case of defense 
expenditure. 
6 The majority of countries do not exhibit causality running from GDP to public spending. The causality 
can be bidirectional (8 countries), or unidirectional (23 countries). 
7Courakis et al.’s (1993) study examined 2 countries (Greece and Portugal) and found significant 
differences in responses to some determinants of public expenditure and between the two countries. 
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essentials to other advanced capitalist democracies. We know now that there are 
problems because each period and each country (Higgs 2007, p.40) have their own 
determinants. Therefore, econometric theory promises more than it can deliver (Leamer 
2010, p.36). 
 
3. The costs of public goods and Baumol’s Law 
Wagner’s Law seems therefore a bad explanation of the rise of public spending. Let’s see 
if Baumol’s Law (1967, Baumol and al. 1985) or Baumol’s cost disease theory is better. It 
is an explanation by the costs without microeconomic foundation. It suggests that the 
increases in the marginal cost of government relative to that for private goods, due to 
the public sector’s relatively intensive use of labor and slower productivity advance, will 
decrease the size of government (West 1991, p.368, Winer et al. 2008, p.418). 
3.1 Theory 
Baumol’s disease is the hypothesis that productivity improvements in services sectors 
are less likely than in the goods-producing section of the economy because of the 
inherent nature of services. To understand the cost disease starts with an observation. 
In 1913 Ford introduced assembly line to move cars between workstations. This 
allowed workers, and their tolls to stay in one place which cut the time to build a model 
T car from 12 hours to less than two. In some sectors of the economy, however, such 
productivity gains are much harder to come. Performing, for instance, a Mozart quartet 
take just as long in 2012 as it did in the late 18th century. Employers in such sectors 
nonetheless have always needed to increase the wage of their workers to limit their 
defection. The result is that the costs of production in stagnant sectors rise, firms are 
forced to raise prices. These increases are faster than those in sectors where 
productivity is improving and faster than inflation. So prices of goods from stagnant 
sectors must rise in real terms (Baumol 2012). Health spending or education spending 
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must rise as a share of GDP. The implications for government spending are important, 
because many of the public services provided by governments like health, education, 
national defense, justice suffer cost disease (Baumol 1993). Cost disease explains why 
the size of government increases. The theory means that cutting costs without 
reductions in quality may not be possible.  
 
Figure 1: Baumol’s Law and X-inefficiency of bureaucracy 
 Price-Tax 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Baumol effect in demand side 
 
Figure 1 describes cost disease. If demand is inelastic the public spending increases 
mechanically (effect 1 Figure 1). If the demand is elastic, the costs of public expenditure 
increase and the demand decrease (effect 2, Figure 1). There is an upward shift of MC 
curve which leads to a decrease in the quantity of public goods. Baumol’s Law is very 
sensible to the assumption done about the elasticity of demand. 
3.2 Empirical Tests 
Since Beck (1976) the usual variable to test Baumol’s law is the relative price of public 
goods to GDP as measured by the ratio of the implicit deflator for public consumption8 
to the GDP deflator. It is used as an approximation for the relative cost of public 
                                                          
8 Implicit deflators are calculated by dividing an aggregate measured in current prices by the same 
aggregate measured in constant prices.  
Source: http://www.insee.fr/en/methodes/default.asp?page=definitions/deflateur.htm 
 
 
    
    
 
   
(1) 
Baumol effect in supply side (1.1) 
versus 
-X-inefficiency (1.2) 
 
2   
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production or Baumol’s Disease effect (Lybeck and Henrekson 1988; Katsimi 1998, 
p.130). Bradford et al. (1974) or Ferris and West (1999) use rather a differential of wage 
between public and private sector (Bradford, et al. 1974).  
3.2.1 Baumol’s law is validated?  
The explanation of government size by the cost disease would have received an 
empirical support (Holsey and Borcherding 1997, p. 569, or p. 574, Table 3), but the 1) 
the public goods are only a part of public spending beside social transfer and public 
redistribution and 2) the indicator which measures the cost of public goods and the 
causality between the variables are not clear. The measure of public productivity is 
difficult and may be not possible under the Mises’s Theorem.  
 
Table 3. Baumol’s Law: a strong empirical support  
(Appendix A.3, bibliography 20 articles) 
Authors Sample Periods Result 
Bradford et al. (1969 USA 1925-1965 Rising unit costs have been a major source 
of recent increases in local public budgets 
Tussing et al. (1974) USA 1900-1969 Support 
Beck (1976)    
Spann (1977)   Support 
Delorme/André (1978) France 1872-1971 No support (primary education) 
Beck (1979) 13 OECD 1950-1977  
Peltzman (1980) USA 1929-1974 Support (ratio of price deflators) 
Pommerhen et al. (1982) Switzerland   
Berry et al. (1983)    
Berry et al. (1984) USA 1948-1979 Support (Beck’s indicator) 
Lybeck (1986) 12 OECD  No support in France, Sweden, and USA but 
support for Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, West Germany, Italy, Norway? 
Netherland, and UK.  
Henrekson/Lybeck (1988) Sweden 1950-1983 Support (Beck’s indicator) 
Henrekson (1988) Sweden 1950-1983 Support (Beck’s indicator) 
Neck et al. (1988) Austria   
Ferris and West (1996) USA 1959-1989 Mix. Relative productivity hypothesis is not 
sufficient (Beck’s indicator)  but relative 
wages explain large proportion of the 
change. 
Ferris and West (1996) USA 1959-1984 No support (one third of the increase in the 
relative costs of government services was 
due to increases in wages in the public 
sector relative to the private sector. 
Ferris and West (1999) USA 1947-1979 Support (Real wage rate in manufacturing) 
Katsimi (1998) 19 
countries 
1961-1987 No support  
(Beck’s indicator, opposite sign) 
Borcherding, et al.(2004) OECD 1970-1997 Support (Beck’s indicator) 
Neck and Getzner (2007) Austria 1924-2002 Support (Beck’s indicator) 
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3.2.2 Theoretical argument is not completely convincing 
Moreover theoretical argument is not perfectly convincing. In Baumol’s cost disease 
perspective the nature of public activity explains the increase in Government size. The 
famous example of the string quarter illustrates the operation of the cost-disease but 
does not recognize, nonetheless, the role of innovations in the process. In 1780 four 
quartet players required forty minutes to play a Mozart composition: today forty 
minutes of labor are still required. However, the technology of electronic reproduction 
has improved the productivity of the string quartet. Even if the number of musical 
performances does not rise, the quantity of performance output, measured in 
consumption units has skyrocketed (Cowen 1996, p.208). If public sector blocks 
innovative process, then the lag between productivity in public and private sector is 
more result of inefficiency than the cause of government growth (Mueller 2003, p.510). 
Moreover it is not sure that cost disease has not been cured. Triplett and Bosworth 
(2003), for instance, find that labor productivity in services industries has grown as fast 
recently as it has in the rest of the economy. Baumol’s disease for them will be cured. It 
is always difficult to determine the net result (Nordhaus 2006).  
The interpretation of the correlation is moreover not obvious, because we do not know 
precisely if cost disease is the result of the nature of public good. Katsimi (1998, p.118) 
gives three interpretations. Firstly, the public sector is more labor intensive (Baumol 
1967) and therefore less affected by technological progress than the private sector. 
Secondly, the public sector assumed to be less volatile than the private sector because 
the public sector does not generally aim at profit maximization, is less dependent on 
relative price shocks and productivity shock. Public employment is more stable. These 
assumptions suggest that countries with more volatile output will have a higher 
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“demand-driven” size of the public sector. Katsimi (1998, p.127) called the mechanism 
the insurance effect on the size of public sector. 
 
Thirdly the productivity differential may result from the absence of markets for public 
sector products that allows for inefficiencies. We do not know, then, if the rise of public 
costs is linked at the nature of public activity or at the inefficiency of public bureaucracy. 
4. Bureaucracy 
4.1 Theories 
Indeed bureaucrat inefficiency is another explanation by the costs. In Figure 2, the price-
tax rise is the result -1- of a direct attempt by bureaucrats to maximize their budget, -2- 
of their incompetence (X-inefficiency), -3- the self-interest on the part of public servants 
and/or -4- of a lack of competitive pressure. Buchanan/Tullock pointed to a 
disproportionate increase in the salaries of civil servants and to the transfer that is 
thereby effected (Cullis and Jones 1984, p.198, Figure 2, effect 1.2). Public employees 
have preferences for larger budgets (Niskanen 1975, 1994) and constitute a sizable 
share of the electorate (Mueller and al. 2010, 16.6.2).  
Tullock (1972), Craswell (1975) and Buchanan and Tullock (1977) have hypothesized 
that when the number of employees of a government program or the number of 
beneficiaries grow, there will be an increasing percentage of the population in favor of 
even further growth in the level of spending for these programs. This makes it more 
likely that higher levels of expenditures will be voted for by the people’s representatives 
(Green and Munley 1979, p.92).  
Buchanan and Tullock (1977) explained also the rise of public spending by the voting 
power of bureaucrats (Courant and al. 1979). This increased voting power has enabled 
appointed public officials to extract higher wages from elected public officials. Voting 
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power of bureaucrats has increased in the postwar era and leads a rise of bureau wages 
relative to private sector wages.  
4.2 Empirical Tests 
It is commonplace to consider the voting propensities of bureaucrats when testing for 
the validity of the others explanations by the costs (Frey et al. 1982). Bush and Denzau 
(1977) and/or Bennet and al. 1983) find that voter participation is higher for 
bureaucrats than for private sector voters. Jaarsm and al. (1986) for Netherlands do not 
support the assumption of a higher electoral power of bureaucrat. In general the direct 
empirical evidence would not very supportive of this explanation (Courant, Gramlish 
and Rubinfield 1980, Kau and Rubin 1981, Lowery and Berry 1983, Garand 1988). 
 
However, Cuzan and Heggen (1985, p.31) found that fiscal expansion erodes the political 
support of the incumbents in the United State (1928-1980) and Great Britain (1935-
1983). In USA and UK it does not follow that more spending yields greater support 
(Cuzan and Heggen 1985, p.32). When size of State rise, for every vote gained in the 
bureaucracy and interest group, more than one vote is lost in the electorate at large 
(Cuzan and Heggen 1985, p.32). Therefore, the results are mixed. 
 
5. Interest Group 
Public sector employees can act as interest groups. Special interests do have substantial 
influence over legislative decisions. They try to beneficiary of public spending (Tullock 
1959, Marlow and Orzechowski 1996). Becker (1983) developed a model of the 
influence of interest groups on the rise of public spending. Interest groups expand either 
the redistributive or the public good expenditure components, or both. The demand of 
redistribution will be a function of interest group strong. Each interest group demand 
lower taxes and higher subsidies (Mueller 2003, p.521). Special interests are Medical 
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association, Airplane owners and Pilots association, Labor Unions, farmers, unemployed, 
old and retirement, young and their families, union of civil servant, and/or the big firms. 
They will be highly consumer of public spending (Lewis-Beck and Rice 1985, Rice 1986).  
5.1 Civil servant 
Public sector employees are a strong interest group. Buchanan and Tullock (1977) 
predict that public sector employees will be commonly believed to favor an expanding 
role for the public sector. This view predicts that public sector unionism exerts a 
positive influence on demand for public programs through their voting and lobbying 
efforts (Marlow and Orzechowski 1996, p.3). Summers, Gruber and Vergara (1993) 
argue that corporatism increases the size of the public sector. Calmfors and Driffill 
(1988) constructed a corporatism index. They find some empirical evidence to support 
the hypothesis that a tax increase will reduce labor supply by less in a more corporatist 
economy. This is explained by the fact in corporatist economies the level of labor supply 
is controlled by a small group of decision-makers who perceives the linkage between 
taxes and benefits better than individual workers do. Garrett and Way (1999) or Crouch 
(1990) supports the hypothesis that a positive relationship exists between corporatism 
and public spending. 
5.2 The poor and unemployed 
The second group often successful in securing government funds is composed of 
individuals disadvantaged by unhealthy economic conditions. It is not only the poor but 
the unemployed and underemployed people who regularly pressure government for 
immediate relief from their plight.  
5.3 Young and old 
The third group the most prominent is the young and old. The young (and their parents) 
make demands for educational needs and old press for increased income assistance and 
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medical benefits (Rice 1986, p.242, Shelton 2008). Both labor tax rates and per capita 
transfers in advanced economies are historically positively correlated with the ratio of 
retirees to the working age population and negatively correlated with the ratio of 
children to the working-age population (Shelton 2007, 2008). This result obviously 
depends strongly of institutions. Social security increases mechanically the social 
spending of government. There is a priori no relationship between ageing and public 
spending.  
Nonetheless, this literature is limited and the proxy variables constructed to measure 
the influence of interest group is not yet stabilized. There are: the number of consumer 
and business interest groups, the union membership, the number of trade union, 
number of political parties, the share of farm population, number of government 
employees, etc. There is no consensus. There is also a problem in the definition of 
interest groups. It is difficult to assimilate old and young at labor union or political party. 
The interests of farm population is likely more homogeneous than the interests of 
young. The empirical results are not clear because the definition are not completely 
stabilized and the theory imperfect.  
 
6. The cost of taxation 
6.1 Theory 
The demand of public good is a function of the price-tax (Figure 2). A rise in price should 
decrease the demand. In contrast, its decreasing should lead to the inverse effect. In 
Figure 2 the price of public goods   is equal to their (assumed) constant marginal 
resource cost (MC) while total social marginal costs including excess burden, compliance 
and evasion costs of taxation is the curve,       (Winer, Tofias, Grofman and Aldrich 
2008, p.417). The reduction of the deadweight losses associated with taxation increases 
the demand of public spending (Kau and Rubin 1981, 2002).  
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An improvement in the efficiency of either taxes or spending would reduce political 
pressure for suppressing the growth of government and thereby increase total tax 
revenues and spending (Becker and Mulligan 2003). The rise of nation-State and the tax 
collection costs falling are correlated. Kau-Rubin (1981) discovered that one significant 
cost of government has fallen over time, the welfare cost of tax collection (Ferris and 
West 1999, p.310).  
Figure 2: Kau and Rubin’s effect (Winer et al. 2008) 
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The Kau and Rubin’s explanation implies, nonetheless, ceteris paribus, a downward shift 
in the cost of government services and the potential for greater consumer surplus for 
consumers of government services. West (1991) considered one possible violation of 
ceteris paribus and argued government as Leviathan will attempt to capture it for itself. 
The downward movement in cost of public spending will be frustrated by the offsetting 
pressure on conventional payroll costs, thrust upwards by the opportunistic forces of 
Leviathan (Ferris and West 1999, p.311).  Then the Leviathan hypothesis predicts that in 
addition to relative employment size, this created variable will be positively related to 
the cost providing government services.  
       
   M 
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6.2 Empirical Tests 
The number of article testing Kau/Rubin hypothesis is low. Kau and Rubin (2002) 
consider that 1) entry of women into the labor force where they can be much more 
easily taxes; 2) declines in the extent of self-employment making it harder to avoid or 
evade taxes; and 3) increasing computerization which they think shifts the power to 
enforce compliance to government (Winer and al. 2008, p.417).  
Table 4.Cost of taxation and size of government 
(Appendix A.4, bibliography 4 articles) 
Authors Sample Period Result 
Kau et al.  (1981) USA 1929-1970 Support 
Ferris et al.  (1996) USA 1959-1989 Support 
Kau et al. (2002) USA 1930-1993 Support9 
Winer et al. (2008) USA 1930-2002 No support 
 
The debates between econometricians are also rather sharp. Winer and al (2008, p.445) 
conclude their paper to saying;  it is fair to say that the original model of Kau and Rubin 
(2002) is not robust and, in particular they clearly do not support the original 
hypothesis about the importance of the supply-side in the growth of government. For us 
nonetheless the female participation could be explained 15% of total government 
growth in USA (Winer and al. 2008, p.441).  
7. Political regime 
7.1 Theory 
The political regime would have also an effect on the dynamic of public sector. Indeed, 
Persson et al. (1997, 2000, 2007) suggest that the parliamentary form of government 
promotes a stronger incentive to internalize the distortions arising from taxation 
(Milesi-Ferretti and al. 2002, p.646).  
 
                                                          
9Kau/Rubin (2002) female participation is significant and positive, indicating that the ability to tax 
working females is an important part of the growth of government. Self-employment is significant but has 
the opposite sign from our prediction and from the results of our earlier paper, from 1929-70. This means 
that since 1970 something has happened to make it easier to tax the self employed; we have no 
explanation for this result. 
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The West’s hypothesis could be moderated by a political regime which will limit the 
opportunism of Fiscal Leviathan. Indeed, if the marginal distortion is high the monotonic 
relationship in the existing theory between regime type and the size of government may 
even break down (Anderson 2012, p.83). Hence, with a high marginal tax distortion, the 
size of government and the total economic loss from the distortions can be lower in a 
parliamentary system than in a presidential form of government, while the opposite is 
more likely if taxation is less distortionary. Intuitively if the government is dominated by 
one strong member, all residual government revenue will be directed towards this 
member’s constituent, and taxation will hence be perceived as less costly to these 
recipients. The incentive for the government to internalize the tax distortions is then 
relatively weak (Anderson 2012, p.84). It is a mechanism of residual claimant applied to 
public finance. The presidential form of government would promote a weaker incentive 
than the parliamentary system because there is the separation of powers.  
7.2 Empirical Tests 
Persson and Tabellini (1999) found that strong support for the prediction that 
presidential regimes have lower spending in a cross section of 50 democracies in the 
early 1990’s.Persson and Tabellini (2004) have collected data for 80 democracies, 
averaging yearly outcomes over the period 1990–1998. They showed also that 
presidential regimes induce smaller governments than parliamentary democracies. The 
explanation by the costs assumes, nonetheless, an inelasticity of the demand. Fiscal 
illusion can explain this inelasticity. Then, fiscal illusion maintains the rise of public 
spending by the costs.  
 
8. Fiscal Illusion 
The effect of costs variation or tax-price variation on demand is, nonetheless, a function 
of information of voters. Individuals will not obtain perfect information but rather an 
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optimal amount. There are two assumptions. Either benefits of government expenditure 
have low visibility, being diffusive, long term and not obvious and in contrast the 
sacrifice of taxes are highly visible (Downs 1960) or voters systematically 
underestimate the cost (taxes) of public sector activity and overestimate the benefits of 
government expenditures (Cullis and Jones 1987, p.220).  
8.1 Theory 
Wagner (1976) draws attention to the role of tax structure in fiscal illusion. The 
complexity of the tax system increases the cost of obtaining budgetary information 
which leads individuals to consistently underestimate their true fiscal burden. So voters 
underestimate the real price-tax of public goods mainly because government 
manipulates the tax structure and produce perception bias of voters by public debt, 
public deficit, and /or share direct taxes to total taxes. Political agents choose tax 
structures (composition of revenues) to minimize the political costs (vote loss) of raising 
budget (Hettich and Winer 1984). The consequence of this political strategy is fiscal 
illusion (Puviani 1903, Buchanan 1967, Wagner 1976, Mueller 1987, p.140, Dollery 
1996, Da Empoli 2002). Fiscal illusion would increase the quantity of public output 
demanded. It is another source of budget expansion. 
 
Figure 3: Fiscal Illusion (Wagner 1976) 
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In figure 3 the perceived tax price is    where the quantity of public output is    and the 
budget       . Fiscal illusion leads voters to underestimate the actual cost of 
government inducing to purchase more government services than they otherwise 
would. Indeed if the real tax price was   ; the demand should be   .  
When Baumol’s disease effects or bureaucratic inefficiency assumes inelasticity of 
demand, implicitly it takes into account fiscal illusion. The price-tax increases but the 
demand is always the same. Fiscal illusion can explain inelasticity of demand. 
8.2 Empirical Tests 
Since Wagner (1976) empirical works use direct evidence (Lewis 1982). It is not a 
surprise but in general results have been mixed (Dolory 1996, p.31, Table 5). This is as 
usual attributable to the diversity of data and models employed (Dollory 1996, p.31). As 
usual also this literature has some technical problems.  
8.2.1 Problems of old econometric 
This literature has the traditional problems of old econometric: -1- endogeneity 
problem, -2- unit root and co-integration problems and -3- causality problems. The 
solutions to these problems have led to the use of more-sophisticated estimation 
techniques than the simple ordinary least squares estimates used early on. 
- Oates (1988) summarized the literature and argued that the existing empirical 
results are seriously compromised by the failure to deal with the possible 
endogeneity of the illusion variable and to discriminate among competing 
hypotheses (Marshall 1991, p.1336, Dollory 1996, p.31).  
- Christopoulos and Tsionas (2003, p.440) focus on unit root and cointegration 
problem. Many economic time series contain unit roots and that has not 
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acknowledged in empirical research, with the exceptions of Ashworth (1995) and 
Hondroyiannis and al. (2001).  
- Taking into account these two problems Christopoulos and al. (2003) estimate 
that deficit public illusion hypothesis is correct for their sample and their period. 
-  Young (2009) and Ross and Yan (2013) treated, rather the problem of causality. 
Young (2009) uses Granger causality test and error correction model. Ross and 
Yan (2013) develop natural experiment.  
 
Table 5. Fiscal Illusion  
(50% support Fiscal Illusion Hypothesis, Appendix A.4, Bibliography, 10 articles) 
Authors Sample Period Result 
Gemmell et al. (1999) UK 1955-1994 No effect of public deficit 
Positive effect of 
expenditure taxes to 
government revenues 
Dikson and Yu (2000) Canadian Province 1962-1992 Support 
Mitias et al. (2001) 5 Midewestern states (USA) 1970-1980 Support10 
Hondroyiannis et al. (2001) Greece 1961-1994 Support. 
Christopoulos et al. (2003). UE 1970-1999 Support.  
Blom-Hansen (2005) 1000 Danish renters’ and 
home owners perception 
2000 No support 
Neck et al. (2007) Austria 1924-2002 No support 
Young (2009) USA 1959-2007 Support 
Banzhaf and al. (2012) USA 1998-2006 No support of rent effect 
Ross and Yan (2013) Virginia city (USA, 1997-2009) 2000-2008 Partial support 
 
The contemporary literature despite the progress of methods is still rather inconclusive. 
Banzhaf and Oates (2012) conclude that the preference for local debt over tax finance 
does not have its source in debt illusion. Debt illusion is not supported by their study. 
Moreover fiscal illusion is not robust explanation of inelasticity of public good demand 
and size of State in general. It is, may be, because the models have a bad specification 
and does not control by fiscal decentralization measure. Fiscal decentralization 
increases political competition, decreases the price of tax information and in fine limits 
fiscal illusion. 
                                                          
10 They distinguish two alternative sources of fiscal illusion: grant illusion (creates the flypaper effect) and 
tax illusion.  
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8.2.2 The diversity of measures 
The variety of the results can also be attributed at the diversity of measures to proxy 
fiscal illusion (problem of measure). The forms of fiscal illusion tested include:-1- 
complexity of the tax structure or Herfindhal index (Wagner 1976, Clotfelter 1976, 
Pommerhen and Schneider 1978, Baker 1983, Breeden and Hunter 1985, Cullis and 
Jones 1987, Dollory 1996 Table 1, p.7), -2- income elasticity of the structure11 (Dilorenzo 
1982, Oates 1988, Dollory 1996, Table 2, p.13), -3- public deficit illusion (Niskanen 
1978, Provopoulos 1982, Khan 1988, Diamond 1989, Craigwell 1991, Tridimas 1992, 
Ashworth 1995, Hondroyiannis and Papapetrous 2001, Christopoulos and Tsionas 
2003), -4- consumption expenditures relative to debt levels i.e. debt illusion (Dollory 
1996, Table 5, p.29), -5- the flypaper effect12 (Winer 1983, Dollory 1996, Table 3, p.19, 
Inman 2008) and -6- renter illusion13 (Dollory 1996, Table 4, p.23). Then, the first 
problem is that it exists a doubt on how fiscal illusion is represented empirically 
(Dicksons and Yu 2000).  
 
The solution could be in the construction of a Fiscal Illusion index. This index would give 
homogeneity in models and tests (Dell’s Anno and Dollery 2012, Mourão 2008, Alt J, 
Lassen 2006), would limit the doubts and leads a new question: what are the 
determinants of fiscal illusion. The structure of employment (self-employment as a 
percentage of total employment) and nominal marginal tax rates increase, for instance, 
the visibility of the tax burden and constitute the greatest incentives for politicians to 
distort taxpayers’ perceptions (Dells’ Anno and Dollery 2012, p.270). The education 
                                                          
11 Fiscal illusion occurs when the structure of the tax code privileged indirect tax, or hidden or less salient 
taxes. In this environment voters believes that the costs of public services is less than what they perceive 
it to be. 
12 Fly-paper effect occurs when politicians use the grant to suggest a lower cost of taxation.  
13The renter illusion hypothesis holds that renters underestimate their property tax burden and therefore 
support excessive levels of local expenditure. 
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level of the population would be also an important determinant of fiscal illusion 
(negative correlation) (Mourao 2008). Then a human capital variable could be 
introduced to explain fiscal illusion and indirectly size of government.  
8.2.3 Ecological Inference 
But the main problem is ecological inference problem. If it is true that several studies 
find that juridictions with a large number of renters spend more a local public services 
and have higher tax levels (Blomm-Hansen 2005, p.127, Table 1, pp.129-130), however 
survey on Danish renters’ and home owners perception demonstrates that renters suffer 
from ignorance but not illusion. More tests of renters’ and home-owners’ perception of 
property taxes are needed to reach firm conclusions. There is a doubt about the micro-
foundation of the renter illusion hypothesis (Blomm-Hansen 2005, p.138).  
 
9. Fiscal decentralization 
Fiscal decentralization is an institutional variable. Theoretically a greater competition 
can constrain the ability of all governments to expand. There are two models: 
competition within a governmental unit (political fragmentation) and competition 
between government units (Brennan and Buchanan 1980, Persson and Tabellini 1999). 
Fiscal decentralization should limit fiscal illusion because it is an effective check on 
government (Prohl and Schneider 2009). 
9.1 Political competition, price of information and fiscal decentralization 
The decentralization hypothesis is that “total government intrusion into the economy 
should be smaller, the greater the extent to which taxes and expenditures are 
decentralized” (Brennan and Buchanan 1980, p.15). Political competition decreases the 
price of information. Competition between central government and local authorities and 
between local authorities may be interpreted as an incentive to limit the 
underestimation of price-tax because it improves the knowledge of real tax-price. 
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Therefore, fiscal decentralization hypothesis argues that greater competition between 
governments constrains the ability of all governments to expand. Nonetheless if fiscal 
decentralization policy generally shifts central government employees to the sub-
national government level the question is whether the decrease in central government 
employment at the sub-national government level overwhelms the decrease in public 
employment at the central level (Martinez-Vasquez and Yao 2009, p.562). 
Table 6. Fiscal decentralization 
(Appendix A.6, Bibliography 25 articles). 
Authors Sample/ Period Result 
Oates (1985) 43 No support 
Nelson (1986) 49 USA States Support 
Marlow (1988) Federal and State Local USA Support 
Raimondo (1989) USA Mixed support 
Forbes and al. (1989) 345 No support 
Zax (1989) 43 Support 
Grossman (1989) Federal and State Local USA Support 
Joulfaian/Marlow (1990) 48 USA (1981/1984 Support 
Heil (1991) 22 OECD and 33 FMI No Support 
Joulfaian/Marlow (1991) 48 USA, 1983/1984/1985 Support 
Grossman and al. (1994) Canada (1958-1987) Support 
Ehdaie (1994) 30 countries (1987) and 26 (1977-1987) Support 
Comiskey (1993) OECD Support 
Anderson and al. (1998) 45  No support 
Persson and Tabellini (1999) 64 countries Support14.  
Shadbegian (1999) USA (1979-1992) Support 
Stein (1999) Latin America Support 
Lalvani (2002) Indian Federation Support 
Jin an et al. (2002) 30 OECD (1980-1994) Support 
Feld et al. (2003) 26 Swiss Cantons (1980-1998) Support 
Rodden (2003) 50OECD  (1976-1996) Support 
Fiva (2006) 18 OECD (1970-2000) Support 
Martinez-Vasquez  (2009) 74 (1985-2005) No support 
Prohl et al. (2009) 29 countries Support 
9.2 Empirical evidence 
Empirical tests of the decentralization hypothesis is assumes that appropriate 
definitions exclude the federal sector from the definition of the government market 
(Oates 1985, Nelson 1986, Raimondo 1989, Forbes and Zampelli 1989, Zax 1989) or that 
appropriate definitions includes all levels of government in market definitions and 
measures decentralization in terms of the extent of state and local activities relative to 
                                                          
14 The size of State is smaller under presidential regimes and majoritarian elections are associated with 
fewer public services. 
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federal activity (Joulfaian and Marlow1991, Grossman 1989, Marlow 1988). In contrast 
of Golem (2010) which sustains that in the empirical literature little consensus on the 
relationship between fiscal decentralization and the size of government is reached 
(Golem 2010) table 6 assesses at 75% the papers which support fiscal decentralization. 
Then, in the countries where the fiscal decentralization is low, fiscal illusion should be 
high. An interaction variable like fiscal decentralization x Fiscal illusion could be tested. 
 
10. Political fragmentation and ideological polarization 
10.1 Political fragmentation  
Political fragmentation strengthens the positive of interest group on size of government. 
It affects the size of government spending (Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen 1983).  In this 
context, political fragmentation refers of the number of different interests existing in a 
country. Greater fragmentation is expected to increase government expenditure, 
because taxation is common pool but benefits of public goods are concentrated. In 
politic the costs of an expense are not fully internalized. The larger is the number of 
agents that shares the costs the lesser the degree to which each of them internalizes the 
costs of the public goods15. Then, it is argued, firstly, that coalition governments 
(executive fragmentation) spend more than single-party governments, because each 
party in a coalition does not fully internalize the fiscal cost of spending. And secondly, it 
is sustained that coalition in Assembly spend more than single party (legislative 
fragmentation).  
10.2 Ideological Polarization 
Some paper develops the ideas that it is not the political fragmentation which is 
important but the political polarization (Volkerink and De Haan 2001, Nupia 2007, 
Eslava and Nupia 2010). Then the ideological distance between the agents measures the 
                                                          
15All the literature around the “pork barrel” mechanism develops this ideas which involves that the 
benefits of government programs are concentrated and the costs are spread among all taxpayers. 
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political polarization. The assumption is following:  greater polarization increases the 
incumbent’s incentives to rise spending because faced with a high risk of being replaced 
by someone from a different party incumbent politician may increase in his/her 
preferred goods (Eslava and Nupia 2010). The cost will be paid by his/her successor and 
fall disproportionately on the goods preferred by that successor. Ideological 
heterogeneity has a positive effect on size of government. 
10.3 Empirical evidence 
There is a great diversity of measures to proxy political fragmentation. Fragmentation is 
measured by the number of spending ministers and the number of parties in 
government coalition (executive fragmentation) and/or the number of parties, the 
numbers of parties in parliament,  and ideological fragmentation in parliament 
(legislative fragmentation) (Volkerink and De Haan 2001). The number of paper is yet 
relatively low and it is always difficult in these conditions to conclude. However 
empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that a positive relationship exists between 
political fragmentation and public spending (Marlow and Orzechowski 1996 and Table 
7). Political fragmentation would have a positive impact on the level of government 
spending.  
However, there is some anecdotal evidence that points to the opposite direction 
(Matakos and Xefteris 2012, p.1). Switzerland, for instance, exhibits high levels of 
fragmentation and low levels of government spending and very healthy public finances. 
Greece, on the contrary, has a single-party government, a large stock of public debt and a 
lot of government spending. Matakos and Xefteris (2012, p.6) observes in Greece (1996-
2010) that the government spending cuts caused an increase in fragmentation across all 
regions. They find the existence of a reverse causal link between government spending 
and electoral fragmentation. They document this result by the mean of a natural 
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experiment. It is a natural experiment because coalition government, formed at the 
aftermath of the June 2012 legislative elections, was a result of the 2010 debt crisis, not 
its causal factor. The Greek government has fiddled the books and under report the 
public deficit figures for 2006-2007. The Greek voters voted with these new 
informations. The action of Greek government altered voters’ expectations on future 
government spending because public between the two electoral contests cannot be 
attributed to policies followed those couple of months by the present administration. 
Rather it is attributed to newly disclosed information (Matakos and Xefteris 2012, p.3).  
Table 7. Political Fragmentation  
(Appendix A.7, bibliography 13 articles) 
Authors Sample/Period Result 
Mueller and al.  (1985)  Larger is the number of parties higher is the size 
of State. 
Henrekson and al. (1988) Sweden Support Legislative fragmentation 
(number of parties) 
Kontopoulos and al. (1999) OECD Countries Legislative fragmentation. the number of parties in 
the governing coalition affects positively spending 
but not deficits 
Volkerink and de Haan 2001  Executive fragmentation. Positive effect is much 
smaller on the deficit than on spending 
Political polarization is not support. 
Padovano and al. (2001) Italian  
(1984-1994) 
Support legislative fragmentation  
(number of parties in governing coalition)  
Perotti and al. (2002) 19 OECD 
(1970-1995) 
Support executive fragmentation 
(number of spending ministers in the cabinet) 
(number of parties in a coalition) 
Mukherjee (2003). OECD Support legislative fragmentation 
(number of parties in a governing coalition) 
Bawn and al. (2006). OECD Support legislative fragmentation  
(number of parties in a governing coalition) 
Persson and al. (2007) 40 parliamentary 
democracy  
(1960-1998) 
Support. Proportional election induces a more 
fragmented party system and a larger incidence of 
coalition governments than do majoritarian 
elections. 
Neck and al. (2007) Austria   
(1924-2002) 
Confirms the importance of party coalition. 
Elgie and al. (2008) OECD  
and no OECD 
Political polarization and number of ministers are 
not support. 
Eslava and Nupia (2010) 22 developing and 
developed countries 
(1978-2005) 
Legislative fragmentation has no effect on 
government spending in the absence of ideological 
polarization and a positive effect when 
polarization is high enough. 
Le Maux and al. (2011) French 
(département) 
(1992-1999) 
Support legislative fragmentation 
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11. Electoral rules 
Political fragmentation is also used by Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2007, p.2) to 
describe the mechanisms behind which electoral rules influence government spending. 
The electoral rules would explain political fragmentation and in fine its consequences on 
public spending. Majoritarian elections would be associated with smaller government 
spending and smaller welfare states than proportional elections 
11.1 Theory 
Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1998) and Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti and Rostagno (2002) 
generate contradictory hypothesis concerning the effects of electoral rules on public 
expenditures. 1) Persson and al. (1998) find that the majoritarian system focuses 
electoral competition on a few key districts, leading to fewer public goods but more 
redistribution than the proportional system. 2) Persson and al. (2007, p.2-18) developed 
another channel. They presented a theoretical model where the electoral rules explain 
political fragmentation and in fine the size of government. Majoritarian elections 
produce single-party governments more often than proportional elections, which 
instead produce fragmentation of political parties and coalitions, or minority 
government (Persson and al. 2007, p.1). 3) Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti and Rostagno (2002) 
studied how the electoral system shapes the trade-off between allegiance to a social 
constituency and allegiance to a geographic constituency. This trade-off is relevant to 
fiscal policymaking because it parallels the distinction between the two main types of 
government spending: transfers and purchases of goods and services. They showed that 
proportional systems are more geared to spending on transfers, while majoritarian 
systems16 are more prone to public good spending. Then total government spending is 
                                                          
16 “In a majoritarian, each district elects one representative. If the distribution of different social groups is 
similar across districts, all representatives will belong to the same social group. Hence, all elected 
representatives derive utility from the same type of transfers, but each derives utility from a different public 
good. It follows that electors will have an incentive to vote for individuals with stronger preferences for public 
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higher in proportional systems if the median voter values relatively little the public 
goods and relatively highly private consumption and transfers, lower in the opposite 
case (Milesi-Feretti et al. 2002, p.610).  
11.2 Empirical Tests 
Persson and Tabellini (1999) test their hypothesis on both electoral system and 
legislative structure (cross-countray data from a sample of 64 countries, 1985-1990)? 
They found that majoritarian electoral system are associated with less expenditure in 
public goods but the results are weak and they don’t look at the effect on transfers 
(Shelton 2007). 1) In both cross-section and panel regressions, Milesi-Feretti et al. 
(2002) found support for the predictions of their model for 40 OECD countries, and 
weaker results for Latin America (Milesi-Feretti 2002, p.611). The two tests have 
contradictory results. 2) Persson and Tabellini (2004) (80 democracy 1990-1998) 
confirmed these predictions. Majoritarian elections lead to smaller government and 
smaller welfare programs than proportional elections. In cross-section regression (100 
countries 1970-2000). 3) Shelton (2007) has documented that government elected 
under majoritarian electoral systems spend less across the board than those elected 
under proportional systems. 4) Persson and al. (2007, p.29), from post-war 
parliamentary democracies, showed that the electoral rule affects government spending 
but only indirectly: proportional elections induce a more fragmented party system and a 
larger incidence of coalition government than do majoritarian election. Nonetheless, 
there are also some anecdotic evidences than majoritarian election has not this 
consequence. In France, for instance, the fourth republic had adopted a proportional 
election and the rise of public spending has been slower than under the fifth republic. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
goods relative to transfers, in order to bias government expenditures on public goods toward their district. In 
equilibrium the result is just high expenditure on public goods” (Milesi and al. 2002, p.610).  
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Therefore, it is difficult to make an opinion because the number of tests are very low and 
the conditions of their realization conditional. 
 
12. Political Rights 
In electoral rules there is also the definition of political rights. In many countries 
political rights are restricted to a privileged minority (Shelton 2007, p.3235). Meltzer 
and Richard (1981) suggested that the government grows when the franchise (Husted 
and Kenny 1997) is extended to include more voters below the median income (the 
decisive voter), when the growth of incomes provides revenues for increased 
redistribution and when the income distribution becomes more uneven (Mueller 1987, 
p.124, Henrekson and Lybeck 1988, p.218). 
12.1 Theory 
In this perspective, economic theory suggests a number of different channels through 
which the changes in restrictions on political participation might have affected public 
spending (Boix 2001; Aidt and al. 2006, p.250): the poor (Meltzer and Richard 1981), the 
social spending via female franchise (Lott and Kenny 1999), the threat of revolution 
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2000), the interests of a population larger (Persson and 
Tabellini 2000 Chapter 8 and 9), and the conflicts of interest among the members of the 
elite (Lizzeri and Persico 200417).  
12.2 Empirical Tests 
Husted and Kenny (1997) look at the extensions of the franchise to poorer votes on 
government expenditure using biennial US state and local data for 1950-1988. They 
document a strong increase in the size of welfare spending (transfers) but little effect in 
public goods. 1) Lott and Kenny (1999) find that the increase in voter turnout due to 
                                                          
17 Group within the elites benefit differently of status-quo. Lizzeri and Persico (2004) shown that it is 
possible that a majority within the elite may favor expanding the franchise. In England, substantial 
subgroups within the elite championed franchise expansion. 
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women’s suffrage explains on the order of 20% of a 90% increase in expenditure over 
the period (Shelton 2007, p.3235). 2) Aidt and al. (2006, p.250) showed that economic 
franchise contributed to growth in government spending during the nineteenth and 
early twentieth century (1830-1938) in 12 countries mainly by increasing spending on 
roads, transportation and communication and internal security and administration and 
that female franchise had an impact on public finance mainly through an increase in 
spending on health, education, housing, redistribution and social insurance, but the 
effects are statistically weak. 3) However, Mulligan and al. (2002, 2004) find that 
government type (autocracy versus democracy) has no effect on social security 
expenditures. Shelton (2007) on the contrary has documented that the increased of 
political rights (Gastil index) has a positive effect in transfers (or social protection). 
 
13 Pre-tax income distribution 
The average level of income may affect public spending (Wagner’s Law). The 
distribution of income in society can also have a consequence.  
13.1 Theory 
Stigler (1970) offered the Director’s Law: “public expenditures are made for the benefit 
primarily of the middle classes, and financed by taxes which are borne in considerable part 
by the poor and the rich” (Borcherding 1985, p.370). Following Romer (1975) inequality 
in pre-tax earnings is considered to yield a larger political demand for redistributive 
policies. Meltzer and Richard (1983) suggested that the increases in mean voter income 
relative to median voter income cause greater redistribution, hence greater government 
expenditure (Holsey and Borcherding 1997, p.576). More recently Bénabou (2000) 
argued that more inequality is associated with lower, not higher, government spending 
on redistribution (Borge and Rattso 2004, p.806). Pryor (1968, p.54) had another 
hypothesis; more is unequal the distribution of income, more police services may be 
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desired. Under this hypothesis the size of Government increases to protect the property 
rights. Therefore, theoretically there is a great confusion. 
Table 8. Inequality 
(Source: Mello and al. 2006, Table 1, Appendix A.7 for Bibliography, 25 articles) 
Authors Sample/Period Result 
Demsetz (1982) USA (1920-1972) No support on the period (1920-1942) 
Support on the period (1950-1972) 
(+inequality=+redistribution) 
Meltzer and al. (1983) USA(1937-1977) Support (Ratio of mean to median income) 
Aubin and al. (1988) France Support (+inequality=(+)redistribution) 
Lybeck (1986) Sweden No support (Ratio of mean to median income) 
Henrekson (1988) Sweden No support (Ratio of mean to median income) 
Henrekson and al. (1988) Sweden Support ((Ratio of mean to median income) 
Henrekson (1990) Sweden Mix 
Perotti (1992) 40 democracies(1970-1985) No support (+inequality=(+)redistribution) 
Kristov and al. (1992) Cross-section No support (Ratio of mean to median income) 
Easterly and al. (1993) 1970-1988 Support (+ inequality= (+)redistribution) 
Perotti (1994) 52 countries No support (+inequality= (+)redistribution) 
Persson and al. (1994) 13 OECD(1960-1981) No support (+inequality=(+)redistribution) 
Lindert (1996) 14 OECD(1962-1981) No support (+inequality= (+) redistribution) 
Perotti (1996) 49 countries (1970-1985) No support (+inequality=(+)redistribution) 
Partridge (1997) 48 US States(1960-1990) No support (+inequality=( +)redistribution) 
Figini (1998) Up to 63 countries 
(1970-1990) 
Support (+inequality=(+)redistribution) 
Gouveia and al. (1998) 50 US States(1970-191) Support (ratio of mean to median income) 
Panizza (1999) 46 US States(1960-1990) No support (+inequality=(+)redistribution) 
Bassett et al. (1999) Up to 54 countries 
(1970-1985) 
No support (+inequality=(+)redistribution) 
Tanninen (1999) Up to 45 countries 
(1970-1988) 
No support (+inequality=(+)redistribution) 
Rodriguez (1999) 50 US States(1984-1988) No support (+inequality=(+)redistribution) 
Milanovic et al. (2000) 24 OECD countries 
(1974-1997) 
No support the median voter hypothesis but  
greater inequality redistribute more. 
Mulligan and al. (2002) 65 countries (1960-1990) No support 
Borge and al. (2004) Norway (1996-1998) Support (+inequality=(+)redistribution) 
De Mello and al. (2006) 57 countries (1972-1998) Support (+inequality=(-)redistribution) 
Shelton (2007) 100 countries (1970-2000) Support 
 
13.2 Empirical Tests 
Empirically the theory has not proven robust (Hosley and Borcherding 1997, p.576, 
Borge and Rattso 2004, p.806, Table 8). It is also very sensitive to the choice of sample 
(Shelton 2007).  Meltzer and Richard (1983) tested their theory with U.S. time series 
data and found that government expenditure levels are positively related to the ratio of 
mean to median income as well as to median income levels (Meltzer and Richard 1983). 
Nonetheless, more recent-country evidence is essentially inconclusive (Mello and 
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Tiongson 2006, Table 1, pp.286-287, Table 8). De Mello and al. (2006) shows also that 
more inequality is associated with lower government spending on redistribution.  
As usual, there is also a problem of causality. Sinn (1996) questions whether the 
causality runs from inequality to redistribution or the other wars around (Borge and 
Rattso 2004, p.806). The solution could be a no linear relationship between inequality 
and redistributive policies (Figini 1998, Moene, K. O. and Wallerstein, M. 2001, Mello 
and Tiongson 2006, p.283). In Moene and Wallerstein‘s model, the practice of 
democratic politics purportedly induces, also, democratic elites to bring demands upon 
government by means of competitive bidding for people’s votes. The more intense the 
level of electoral competition, the more intense the pressure for vote-seeking politicians 
to expand publicly provides benefit. 
14. Income volatility 
14.1 Openness 
The redistributive programs can explain by income volatility. In a high industrial 
concentration where unions have a decisive influence on public choice and the 
socialization of resources is more important (Cameron 197818). Greater is the trade 
dependency the greater the demands on government to maintain economic stability by 
strategic increases in spending (Lindbeck 1976, Rodrik 1998, Kimakova 2009). Societies 
seem to demand (and receive) an expanded government role as the price for accepting 
larger doses of external risk. In other words, government spending appears to provide 
social insurance in economies subject to external shocks (Rodrick 1998, p.998). Katsimi 
(1998) argues a similar idea when he assumes that the public sector is less efficient, but 
also less volatile than the private sector. In a context of economic integration the voters 
moves on the left and converse at an interventionist ideology. In contrast, another 
                                                          
18Openness may be interpreted as the result in a high industrial concentration where unions have a 
decisive influence on public choice (Cameron 1978). 
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literature suggests the inverse relationship. More economic integration will tend to 
reduce tax rates, possibly leading to smaller governments. Indeed a large public sector 
may cause a loss of international competitiveness and a competitive pressure to reduce 
government size (Alesina and Perotti 1997). Loss of competitiveness is a reason either 
the limit free trade or to reduce the size of government.  
Table 9.Size of Government and Openness  
(Appendix A.8, Bibliography, 22 articles) 
Authors Sample Period Result 
Cameron (1978) 18 OECD 1960-1975 Support 
Lewis-Beck et al. (1985) USA 1900-1980 Support 
Lane et al. (1986) 78 1960-1977 Support 
Rice (1986) Western 
European 
1950-1980 Support 
Pampel et al. (1988) 18 Nations 1950-1980 No support 
Hicks et al. (1992) 18 OECD 1960-1982 Support 
Blais et al. (1993) 15 1960-1987 Support 
Comiskey (1993) 13 OECD 1950-1983 Support 
Rodrik (1998) OECD 1985-1992 Support 
Ram (1999) 143 1960-2000 No support 
Iversen et al (2000) OECD 1962-1993 No support. 
Garrett (2001) 100 1970-1995 Support but conditioned by the level of growth 
Adseri et al. (2002) 65 1950-1990 Support 
Milesi-Ferretti et al. 
(2002) 
OECD+Latin 
American 
1960-1994 No  support 
Bretschger et al. (2002) 14 OECD 1967-1996 Support. Globalization has a negative and 
significant impact on corporate taxes. It tends to 
raise labor taxes and social expenditures. 
Garen/Trask (2005). 69 lower 
Average 
growth 
1961-2000 Little support. Less open economies tend to 
have less government expenditure, but have a 
great deal more government in other forms. The 
lower government expenditure gives a 
misleading view, the role of government is large 
in these countries” (Garent and Trask 2005, 
p.549). 
Shelton (2007) 100 countries 1970-2000 Support. Total expenditure increases strongly 
with openness in both industrialized and less-
developed countries. 
Liberati (2007) OECD  No support19 
Benarroch et al. (2008) 96 1970-2000 No support. 
Ferris/Winer (2008) Canada 1861-2000 No support (effect is negative) 
Ram (2009) 150 1960-2000 No support. 
Kimakova (2009) 87  1976-2003 Support 
                                                          
19Capital openness is significantly and negatively related to government expenditures in line with the 
conventional wisdom that capital mobility may undermine the ability of governments to maintain larger 
public sectors. More importantly, the compensation hypothesis originally proposed by Rodrik (1998) and 
traceable back to Cameron (1978) is not in general supported by the data. 
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14.2 Size of Nations 
Moreover, Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) argue that it may be spuriously driven by 
country size, because small countries tend to have large public sectors and be very open 
(Shelton 2007, p.2231). There is a scale effect. Large fixed costs are incurred in setting 
up an administrative system. A country with a small population may experience higher 
public consumption on a per capita basis. Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) showed this 
positive correlation between size of country and size of government.  
14.3 Empirical Tests 
The empirical results are un-conclusive (Table 9). Moreover, political ideology explains 
the level of openness (Kindleberger 1951).  At best openness is an indirect origin of the 
rise of public spending.  
15. Ethnic diversity 
15.1 Theory 
Redistributive program has been also explained by the ethnic diversity or social affinity. 
Kristov, Lindert and McClelland (1992) develop the concept of social affinity to explain 
public sector growth. Individuals care more about themselves than others. They develop 
a model of political activity where interest group activities are not based solely on 
monetary gains or losses but on each individual’s concern about other’s monetary well-
being as well (Hosley and Borcherding 1997, p.580). Whether we associate social 
affinity and ethnic group then the redistribution would be a function of ethnic diversity 
or community resources (MacCarty 1993, Hosley and Borcherding 1997, p.571). The 
total amount of public spending would be negatively related to a country’s ethnic 
diversity (Stichnoth and van der Straeten 2013, p.3).  
Immigration in Europe would challenge the generous welfare state (Alesina and Glaeser 
2004). Voter does not want solidarity of a group which has not his/her identity: ethnic, 
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religious or national. Ethnic diversity theory completes community resources 
hypothesis which argues that lower levels of community resources increase the median 
voter’s tax price per unit of service. The reduction of community contributions increases 
government expenditures levels (Hosley and Borcherding 1997, p.571). 
Nonetheless in Wang’s theory the public spending increases with social instability i.e. 
ethnic or cultural diversity (Wang 2002). Central government spends more in the 
Chinese provinces where there is high proportion of minority because central 
government tries to limit the social instability. These expenditures are public security 
spending and central grants. Therefore Wang suggested the revere relationship than 
Alesina and Glaeser (2004). 
16.2 Empirical Tests 
The number of studies is low and has rather documented a negative association between 
ethnic diversity and some public spending like health or education (Table 10).  
The correlation between ethnic diversity and total public spending is not, nonetheless, 
robust and the evidence for countries other than the U.S. is scarce (Hooghe and al. 2009; 
Stichnoth and van der Straeten 2013, p.380, Table 10).  
 
The cross-country studies have been moreover criticized for a number of reasons 
(Stichnoth and van der Straeten 2013, p.366): the measurement of ethnic diversity is 
imperfect (Facchini 2008), these studies assume sometimes implicitly that ethnic 
diversity does not change or changes slowly, the comparability across countries is 
contestable, the uncertainty in the specification of the model should be explicitly 
recognized, the causality may run from the dependent variable such as the growth of 
GDP per head to the degree of ethnic diversity (Stichnoth and van der Straeten 2013, 
p.367). Therefore in most studies the association is much weaker than for other factors 
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such as own income or beliefs about the role of effort versus luck in determining this 
income (Stichnoth and al. 2013, p.380) i.e. political ideology.  
17. Social Trust 
17.1 Theory 
The explanation by the social trust has a same perspective. The two literatures are 
linked via the relationship between social trust and ethnic diversity. The most current 
research documents a negative relation between ethnic diversity and trust. Hooghe and 
al. (2009) suggested that this pessimistic conclusion coming from North America cannot 
be confirmed at the aggregate level across European Countries. It is an important result, 
because the channel to explaining the evolution of public spending by trust is may be not 
ethnic diversity. The causal chain can be: ethnic diversity →mistrust→ less public 
spending. A larger government results in lower trust (Yamamura 2010).  
Bergh and Bjornskov (2011, p.1) argued the reverse effect. Trust would explain a high 
level of welfare State. Trusting population would be more likely to create and sustain 
large universal welfare states. The causal chain is more social trust → more public 
spending. Trusting populations are more likely to create and sustain large, universal 
welfare States (Bergh and Bjornskov 2011, p.1). Because social trust ensures nations 
from major free-riding problems and thus enables welfare states to develop and remain 
fiscally sustainable (Bergh and Bjornskov 2011, p.2).  
17.2 Empirical Tests 
In general the size of State explains social trust. The cross-country correlation between 
welfare state size and trust would be positive (Kumlim and Rothstein 2005, Uslaner and 
Rothstein 2005; Yamamura 2010). Berggren and Jordahl (2006) used cross country data 
to investigate the effect of government size on trust, but found no stable relationship 
between government size and trust (Yamamura 2010, p.32). Bergh and Bjornskov 
(2012, p. 4) use two instrumental variables: the average temperature in the coldest 
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month of the year and monarchical institutions. Publics spending are correlated at these 
two variables but not social trust in 77 democratic countries (for 2008). 
Table 10. Ethnic diversity (Appendix A.10, Bibliography, Sources: Shelton (2007), and 
Stichnoth and al. 2011, pp.266-268, 13 articles) 
Authors Sample/Period Result 
Mueller and al. 
(1986) 
OECD and few  
other countries 
Support. + Ethic diversity= (-) public spending. 
James (1987) U.S. States The percentage of blacks in the population is correlated with 
the percentage of schools that are private. 
Cutler and al. (1993) U.S. States Ambiguous. The relationship seems to be positive at the 
local level and negative at the state level.  
McCarty (1993) 48 countries 
(1987) 
Mixed. In countries with greater ethnic and religious 
diversity the central government spends less on transfers: 
other government expenditure is unaffected.  
James  (1993) 50 countries Ethno-linguistic and especially religious diversity are 
associated with a greater share of private schools in total 
enrollments. 
Easterly and al. 
(1997) 
African countries A strong negative correlation between indices of ethnic 
fragmentation and measures of public goods 
(telecommunications networks, transportations networks, 
electricity grids and education). 
Poterba (1997) U.S. States  
(1960-1991) 
The negative relationship between public-school spending 
per pupil ant the share of people aged-65 or over in a state’s 
population is stronger in states with  a substantial 
population of older individual who are from a different 
ethnic or racial group than the school’-aged population. 
Alesina and al. (1999) US city-level data Ethnic fragmentation leads to higher levels of public 
employment. 
Goldin and al. (1999) U.S. States High school movement was stronger the more homogenous 
a community was in terms of ethnicity, religion and income. 
Kuijs (2000) 1990-1993 Ethno-linguistic fractionalization is negatively relative to 
health spending and to public spending on education. 
Alesina, and al. 
(2001) 
USA and 
European Union 
(1960-1998) 
Support. [+ racial fractionalization = (-) ratio of transfers to 
GDP] and [no correlation between ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization and public spending]. 
Soroka (2006) OECD  
(1960-2000) 
Mixed. Countries with a high share of immigrants in the 
population in 1970 did not experience a smaller increase in 
social spending between 1970-1998. However, this increase 
is negatively related to the change in the population share of 
immigrants over the period. 
Shelton (2007) 100 countries 
(1970-2000) 
Mixed 
Lind (2007) U.S. States  
(1969-2000) 
Income inequality (before taxes and transfers) between 
racial groups tends to reduce welfare spending by the State, 
whereas income inequality within groups increases it.  
Racial fractionalization is negatively related to welfare 
spending but the correlation is not very strong and not 
robust. 
18.  Political Ideology  
18.1 Theory  
The political sciences and its most cherished of all political variables, political ideology 
(Blais and al. 1993, p.40) could have its revenge. Indeed in 1960-1980 the public choice 
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literature concluded that the cause of public spending and welfare expenditure in a 
country is economic growth and the mechanism that translates economic change into 
public policy like the demographic dynamic (Blais, Blake, and Dion 1993, p.40). Political 
ideology would have no consequence (Hosley and Borcherding 1997, p.587). Kalt and 
Zupan (1984) argued, nonetheless, that the legislators and the elites take advantage of a 
principal-agent slack to vote in agreement with their own ideological preferences. The 
preferences of political elites are not only determined by the quest of power and the 
reelection. They are also determined by the desire to implement their ideology (Lewis-
Beck and Rice 1985, p.11). Homo politicus is not a homo oeconomicus but a homo 
ideologicus. Then it’s not the self-interest which explains the public choice but the 
ideological preferences (Hosley and Borcherding 1997, p.585).  
Political ideology legitimates or not the size of State. The legitimacy is a norm that the 
public actions are desirable and appropriate. It has to do “with the opinion its leaders, 
processes, and policies enjoy among the citizenry” (Cuzan and Heggen 1985, p.26). State 
and political parties invest in legitimacy to enhance their political survival potential and 
reduce political transaction costs (Gallarotti 1989, p.44). Legitimacy of public spending 
growths with the level of these investment in public education and/or medias and with 
“policy successes, victory in war, and the prestige of a nation’s leader” (Cuzan and 
Heggen 1985, p.26).In this theoretical perspective income does not explain political 
preferences (pocketbook voting). In contrast, political ideology shift should explain the 
evolution of government size (Swank 1988; Roubini and Sachs 1989; Garrett et al.  1991; 
Blais and al. 1993; Garrett 1995; De Haan et al. 1993, 1997; Cusack 1997; Pickering et al. 
2011, 2011).In developed countries since the 1930s the voters and political elites accept 
more government intervention into economy. So if the leftist composition of government 
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is more important and the leftist ideology is more share in electorate; there is a rise of 
public spending.  
Table 11. Size of Government and left-wing Ideology  
(Appendix A.11, bibliography, 27 papers) 
Authors Sample Period Result 
Cameron (1978) 18 OECD 1960-1975 Support 
Rao (1979) India 1951-1972 No support 
Solano (1983) 18 OECD 1968-1969 Support 
Hicks et al. (1984) 18 OECD 1960-1971 Support 
Lewis-Beck and Rice (1985) USA 1932-1980 Support 
Swank (1998) 17 OECD 1960-1973 
1973-1980 
effects of leftist and rightist parties mixed, but 
center parties has a positive effect 
Abizadeh et al. (1988) Canada 1945-1984 Support 
Garand (1988) USA 1945-1984 No support 
Roubini/Sachs (1989) 22 OECD 1960-1994 Support 
Garrett/Lange (1991)  15 OECD 1974-1987 support under some conditions 
Hicks et al. (1992) 18 OECD 1960-1982 Support 
Comiskey (1993) 13 OECD 1950-1983 Support 
Blais  and al. (1993) 15 OECD 1960-1989 little supports for partisanship effect 
De Haan/Sturm (1993) 12 EU 1980-1989 Support 
Garrett (1995) 15 OECD 1967-1990 support under some conditions 
Schmidt (1996)    
Cusack (1997) 16 OECD 1955-1987 Support 
Dikson/Yu (1997) Canadian 
Province 
1962-1992 Support 
De Haan/Sturm (1997) 21 OECD 1982-1992 No support 
Katsimi (1998) 190OECD 1961-1987 No support 
Cusack (1999) 14 OECD 1961-1991 Contingent on macroeconomic condition 
Knight (2000) USA 1963-1995 Support 
Rogers/Rogers (2000) USA 1950-1990 Support 
Perrotti and al. (2002) OECD 1970-1995 Support - Left-wing government are 
associated with larger expenditure and 
deficits 
Kau and Rubin (2002) USA 1930-1993 Support 
Besley and Case (2003) USA 1950-1997 Little evidence 
Tellier (2006) Canada 
provinces 
1983-1995 Left spending more than the Center and the 
Right  
Neck and Getzner (2007) Austria  1924-2002 No support 
Ferris and Winer (2008) Canada 1861 -2000 Support 
Winer et al. (2008) USA 1930-2002 Support 
Ansgar/Potrafke (2011) OECD   
Pickering and Rockey (2011) OECD 1945-1998 Support 
Bjornskov and al. (2011) USA 1981-2005 Support 
Pickering and al. (2012) USA 
states 
1950-1997 Support but conditioned by income 
The originality of the explanation by political ideology is to develop a teleological 
explanation in a instrumental context of justification. Its other originality is to explain 
potentially all the other political variables. For instance all the demand models are 
founded on ideological preferences. There is no Wagner’s Law or fiscal illusion if the 
voters do not like public intervention. It is difficult to contradict the idea that bureaucrat 
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believe sincerely in the agency’s mission. Then they have two reasons to defend public 
spending. They work for the public agency (self-interest) and argue that they need even 
larger budgets to improve the economic performance and happiness. Ideological 
fragmentation or polarization transcends ethnic or linguistic fragmentation. Religious 
war is justified by religion and not ethnic diversity. Ideology explains the preferences for 
the redistribution or its aversion. It explains also the level of openness (Kindleberger 
1951). In Peacok and Wiseman’s theory (1961) of displacement effect, the wars and the 
crisis explain the ideological shift. Fiscal decentralization or fiscal federalism is also 
founded on political preference. The basic tenet of fiscal federalism is that increased 
heterogeneity in preferences should lead to a devolution of fiscal policy prerogatives to 
lower levels of government where heterogeneity may by less severe (Shelton 2007).  
18.2 Empirical Tests 
Political ideology shift towards the left-wing should explain the rise of public spending 
legitimacy. Nonetheless, like all independent variables the measure of ideology is 
difficult and its role in the dynamic of public spending remains controversial (Table 11). 
19. Displacement effect or ratchet effect 
19.1 Theory 
The ratchet theory of government growth hypothesizes that temporary crises cause 
government spending to rise and to remain permanently higher if the crises had not 
occurred (Holcombe 1993, Holcombe 2005). The displacement effect has a long run 
effect if there is a ratchet effect. The displacement effect is based on the divergent 
opinions on the size of governments by bureaucrats/politicians (who are in favor of a 
bigger government) and by citizens/taxpayers, who are not willing to finance higher 
levels of public expenditure (Legrenzi 2004, p.191; Rowley and Tollison 1994). While in 
normal periods government grows regularly, during wars or economic crisis the public 
resistance against taxes is lowered and size of government attempts to rise. Then during 
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such periods public spending has much higher value that in normal up to that time. War 
and depression have a displacement effect on size of Government. So political leaders 
use national crises to increase the equilibrium levels of government revenue and 
spending (Carter 2012, p.3).  
19.2 Empirical Tests 
Lybeck and Henrekson (1988) have sustained that the Peacock and Wiseman hypothesis 
remains non-falsified following some thirty years of subsequent research. Table 12, 
nonetheless, shows a great variety in the results (Table 12). The recent research, 
moreover, is divided over the existence of the displacement effect among modern states 
and is largely focused on the developing world (Carter 2012). In fact there is no 
consensus, a great diversity between the countries and methodological problems.  
Table 12 Displacement effect and Size of Government  
(Appendix A.12 bibliography, 18 papers) 
Authors Sample/ Period Result 
Gupta (1967) West Germany, Canada, USA, UK, 
Sweden (1920-1958) 
Support in the case of West 
Germany, Canada, USA and UK 
Reddy (1969) India (1872-1966) Support 
Bonin et al. (1969) UK (1890-1955) Support 
Goffman et al. (1971) Caribbean (1940-1965) No support 
Tussin et al. (1974) USA (1900-1969) No support 
Mahar et al. (1975) Brazil (1920-1969) Support 
Delorme/André (1978) France (1872-1971) Rather no support 
Nagarajan (1979) India (1951-1962) support 
Nagarajan (1983) Sweden (1920-1958) Support 
Rasler and al. (1985)   
Lane et al. (1986) 78 (1960-1977) Support 
Rasler and al. (1989)   
Henrekson (1994) Sweden (1922-1987) No support 
Holcombe (1993) Federal State USA  (two centuries) Mixed 
Nomura (1995) Japan (1860-1987) Support 
Bohl (1996) Canada, (1951-1996) 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK, USA 
UK (1870-1995) 
Germany (1850-1913) 
Support 
No support 
Support 
No support 
Bohl (1999)   
Goff (1999) USA (1889-1995) Support 
Legrenzi (2004). Italy (1861-1980) No support 
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20. So what did we learn? 
Let us devote the least few lines to summarize what we think are the main lessons from 
empirical and theoretical analysis of the literature about the determinants of public 
spending.  
(a) Applied econometric does not seem to be able to select from among the plethora 
of possible explanations of public spending evolution. Each author pointed to 
some factor. But their applied econometric does not offer any evidence. Their test 
is not as evidence from a “crucial experiment”. Therefore after this overview it 
will be difficult to motivate future research by the absence of consensus in 
academic literature on the causes of public spending, because the last article has 
no reason to be the last and to have the statute of “crucial experiment”. Then 
applied econometric should think as circumstantial evidence. It is only a new way 
to write the history of public finance and to collect relevant data. 
(b) The convergence of econometric results is not obvious, because it not possible to 
compare the methods in the time. The authors use their own data, methods and 
sample. That prevents the evidences of “repetitive experiments” and explains the 
potential limits of controlled experiments in economic science. The sophistication 
of technics will not be the solution. 
(c) The problem of causality has not been resolved. Granger’s test has been un-
conclusive and became today obsolete. The instrumental variables are at the 
fashion but their ability to resolve the problem of causality is not obvious. 
(d) The omitted variable bias is always a problem. Shelton (2007, p.2230) developed 
a model to avoid omitted variables bias by testing the prominent theories in a 
comprehensive specification and the temptation to data-mine by playing with the 
specification. Table 13 shows that it will be very difficult to avoid omitted 
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variables bias. The literature is composed of 19 theories and 73 independent 
variables. There is ∑ (  
  
)      possibility to specify a model to explain public 
spending. It will be very difficult, in these conditions, to avoid the omitted 
variable bias. Moreover, there are 73 independent variables, but potentially with 
the interaction variables their number is yet more important. We know, indeed, 
that modern literature multiplies this kind of variable in their models; 
open*OECD1975, Gini*Political Rights, (Shelton 2007), or Political 
Ideology*Income (Pickering and Rockey 2011, 2012).  
 
Therefore, “given all the weakness of econometric techniques, … other ways of testing, such 
as appeals to qualitative economic history, should not be treated as archaic” (Mayer 1980, 
p.176). The prescriptive consequence is that it is not possible to use quantitative 
analysis to discover some invariant generalizations and defend a form of causal 
manipulationism (Woodward 2003). We have to accept the singularity of historical facts 
and the importance of government’s intentions i.e. teleological explanations. 
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Table 13. Dependent and independent variables applied to explain government Growth 
Nominal dependent 
variables 
 
G: Total government 
expenditure;  
GC: Total government 
consumption  
expenditure;  
GT: Total government 
transfer payments;  
G/Y: Ratio of total 
government 
expenditures to GDP 
GC/Y: Ratio of total 
government 
consumption 
expenditures to GDP 
GT/Y: Ratio of total 
government transfer 
payment to GPD 
1.Wagner’s Law (rather no) 
(1)GDP; (2)GDP/N: Ratio of GDP to 
population; (3) Share of total 
population living in urban areas; (4) 
Population in agriculture; (5) Nonfarm 
population ; (6) Total population in 
thousands (7); The automobile 
(Tussing and al. 1974, p.208).  
(105 paper) 
5. Interest group (8 papers,  not robust) 
(18) Corporatism index ; (19) Unemployed  Fraction of 
the population over 65 ; (20) Stock of people below the 
age of 65 who have obtained an early retirement for 
labor market reason and those included in various 
market programs;  (21)Young; (22) Unions of civil 
servant;  (23) Unions in general; (24) Degree of 
unionization, measured as the share of the total number 
of employees belonging to a union; (25) Big firms. 
  8. Fiscal Illusion (not robust) 
(30) Herfindhal index measuring 
the complexity of the tax system 
  ∑   
  
    where    is the share of 
the ith major tax item in total tax; 
(31)Ratio of direct taxes to total 
taxes; (32) Inflation; (33) Measure of 
progressivity of state income tax;   
Fly-paper effect: (34) Estimated per 
capita tax windfall, (35) Dummy 
variable taking the value if 
municipalities practicing internal 
subsidization and 0 if not. 
Debt Illusion: (36) Consumption 
expenditures relative to debt levels; 
(37) Degree of capitalization; (38) 
Ratio Public debt to GDP.  
Renter Illusion: (39) %of electorate 
owing property; (40) % of tenants; 
(41) % of municipal housing owners 
occupied; (42) % homes owner 
occupied;  (43) % of adult renters in 
school district; (44) Proportion of 
homes owners-occupied in town.  
Revenue: (45) Ratio of direct to 
indirect taxes.  
Public deficit illusion. (46) Ratio of 
government budget deficit to GDP; 
(47) Ratio of public expenditure 
financed by tax. 
10. Political fragmentation 
Executive fragmentation 
(51) Number of parties in 
Government; (51) Number of 
spending ministers; (52) 
Dummy variable taking the 
value 1 if government is a 
within-bloc coalition, 2 if it is 
a coalition across blocs and 0 
otherwise.  
Legislative fragmentation. 
(53) Number of parties;  (54) 
Numbers of parties in 
parliament. (not robust) 
2. Fiscal Leviathan (rather no) 
(8) GDP; (9) GDP/N; (10) Tax 
revenues; (11) Tax-share on domestic 
product. 
6. Cost of taxation (not robust, 4 papers) 
(26) Female participation rate; (27) Self-employment; 
(28) Ratio of urban passage vehicule miles to total 
passenger vehicule miles. 
3. Baumol’s Law (rather yes) 
(12) Ratio of the implicit deflator for 
government consumption to the 
implicit GDP deflator (Beck’s 
indicator); (13) Manufacturing output 
per hour; (14) Differential of wage 
between public and private sector.  
7. Political Regime (no relevance) 
(29) Dummy variable taking the value if the regime is 
Presidential and 0 if the regime is Parliamentary.  
11. Ideological polarization 
(no relevance) 
(55) Ideological distance 
between the agents.  
 
 
4. Bureaucracy ( Mixed 9 papers) 
(15) The share of government 
employees in total employment  
(16)Public employment  
(17)Voting propensities of bureaucrats. 
8. Fiscal decentralization (rather yes 25 papers) 
(48) Index of fiscal federalism that incorporates the 
fiscal and administrative autonomy that constitutional 
and statutory law grants to subnational governments; 
(49) Share of local source tax revenue in total revenue;  
(50) Share of public expenditure financed only by the 
source’s own revenue. 
12. Electoral rules (very 
conditional, 5 papers) 
(56) Dummy variable taking 
the value if the electoral 
system is proportional and 0 
if the electoral system is 
majoritarian. 
13. Political rights  
(no relevance) 
(57) Female franchise 
(57); (58) Franchise by 
age; (59) Gastil Index.  
14. Pre-tax income (22 
no robust)  
(60) Gini coefficient 
(inequality); (61) ratio of 
median to mean income. 
15. Income volatility (Not robust 22 
papers) 
(62) Ratio of the sum of exports and 
imports to GDP.  
public sectors). 
16. Size of nation (no relevance) 
(63) Total Population in Thousand (Small countries 
tend to have large. 
19. Political ideology  
(rather  yes, 27papers) 
(68) Dummy variable taking the 
value 1 if there is left-wing 
government and 0 if the government 
is right-wing; (69)Dummy variable 
taking the value 1 if there is left-wing. 
parliament and 0 if the parliament 
has a right-wing majority. (70) The 
median state-citizen ideology. 
20. Displacement effect    
(not robust, 18 papers) 
(71) War;  
(72) War*∆GDP;  
(73) Post War dummy that 
takes the value of 1 after the 
Second World War and 0 
otherwise. 
17. Ethnic diversity (not robust 13 papers) 
(64) Religious fragmentation; (65) Ethnic 
fragmentation; (66) Linguistic fragmentation. 
18. Social trust (no relevance) 
(67) social trust 
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